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Abstract
This report provides a primer on the complex pricing system that has evolved in the
United States to deal with milk production, its assembly (collection), and its distribu-
tion to alternative users. All the various government and private institutions making up
the system are expected to work together to ensure that the public gets the milk it
wants, while dairy farmers get the economic returns needed to provide the milk. The
major institutions are the Federal milk price support program and milk marketing
orders, the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact, State regulations, dairy cooperatives,
and milk and dairy product futures and options markets. Our goal is to provide a
primer on milk pricing that can serve as a steppingstone to other, more detailed works
for those so inclined.
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Summary
Over the past 125 years, a complex pricing system has evolved to deal with the prob-
lems of milk production, assembly, and distribution. The various government and pri-
vate institutions making up the system are designed to work together to ensure that the
public gets the milk it wants, while dairy farmers get the economic returns needed to
provide the milk. The very complexity of the system, however, has baffled many and
led to numerous misconceptions. 
Economic theory posits that the milk pricing system must balance the supply of milk
with the demand for milk. The physical uniqueness of milk complicates many of the
pricing arrangements that are available for other products or commodities. The com-
plex mix of public and private pricing institutions has arisen as producers, processors,
milk marketers, and consumers have grappled with that uniqueness.
The pricing of milk in the United States involves a wide variety of pricing regulations
based on public policy decisions. Some of these regulations include milk price sup-
ports, Federal milk marketing orders, import restrictions, export subsidies, domestic
and international food aid programs, State-level milk marketing programs, and a multi-
State milk pricing organization. Nongovernment pricing institutions are also impor-
tant—the dairy cooperative being a major example. As the dairy industry has become
less regulated in recent years, the use of futures markets has engendered considerable
interest. In almost all cases, the major intent of public pricing policies is to somehow
influence producer (farm) milk prices.
For some 50 years, price supports have been the backbone of the pricing system for
milk and dairy products. The support price underpinned the entire price structure for
bulk milk sold by farmers either directly to processors or through cooperatives.
USDA’s Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) stood ready to buy as much butter,
nonfat dry milk, and Cheddar cheese as manufacturers wanted to sell at specified sup-
port purchase prices. These prices were calculated to return at least the announced
milk support price to the farmer. Until the 1996 Farm Act, interest in developing alter-
natives to the support purchase program was minimal or nonexistent.
Federal milk marketing orders are concerned primarily with the orderly marketing of
raw fluid-grade milk from the producer to the processor. Legal and technical language
makes them complex. Underlying the entire pricing system is the linkage between
prices for various milk classes and the wholesale prices of manufactured dairy prod-
ucts. The 1996 Farm Act required that the Federal milk marketing order system be
reformed.
The 1996 Farm Act offered a concept that had been under discussion in the Northeast
for many years—an interstate compact for dairy market regulation. The proponents of
the compact argued, successfully, that regulatory authority over the dairy marketplace
in the New England States (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, and Connecticut) needed to be restored to the six States, acting together. The
compact has proven to be a lightning rod for regional conflict in the industry. The authority to regulate intrastate milk markets was denied to the Federal
Government in court decisions early in the New Deal period. These court decisions led
the States to make efforts to assist dairy farmers suffering economic hardships at the
time by implementing State milk controls. State regulations are important from a
national perspective because the States that control milk prices tend to be major milk
producers—California and Pennsylvania, for example. State milk pricing is much less
prevalent today than in earlier years.
Not all of the pricing institutions for milk are based on public policy decisions. The
roles of the dairy cooperatives in both regulated and unregulated milk markets have
changed. Cooperatives still represent member interests in the rule-making processes of
Federal- and State-regulated markets, which can include minimum price issues. But
other roles have become more prominent and claimed more of the public’s attention.
In many cases, the cooperatives have assumed operation of a complete procurement
and distribution system for milk. Assembling milk from the farm, routing raw milk
where it is needed, managing or coordinating movements of processed or manufac-
tured products, and managing surplus milk, defined for our purposes as supplies above
fluid requirements, are all parts of the system. Taken together, these activities are
called “balancing.”
The advent of futures and options contracts for Cheddar cheese, butter, nonfat dry
milk, and raw fluid milk was seen by some as the prelude to a new era in milk pricing.
Were they to be widely used, futures and options contracts could manage price insta-
bility. As the role of the price support program has been reduced, milk price volatility
has increased. As long as there is price volatility in cash markets for milk and dairy
products, the dairy industry will continue to evaluate futures and options contracts for
price risk management. 
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		Introduction
Over the past 125 years, a complex pricing system has
evolved to deal with milk production, assembly (col-
lection), and distribution (coordinating milk supplies
with the demands of milk users, both intermediate and
final). The various government and nongovernment
institutions making up the system are designed to work
together to ensure that the public gets the milk it
wants, while dairy farmers get the economic returns
needed to provide the milk. The very complexity of the
system, however, has baffled many and led to numer-
ous misconceptions. 
This report aims to dispel misconceptions by explain-
ing how the current milk pricing structure is set up
and how it works. It is neither a history of milk pric-
ing nor a catalog of all the technical or legal aspects
of pricing regulations. But, some history is recounted
and some details are included to give the reader a feel
for the context in which actions occurred. Our goal is
to provide a primer on milk pricing in the United
States that can serve as a steppingstone to other more
detailed works for those so inclined—a short list of
information sources is included. There is also a glos-
sary of terms for readers not familiar with some of the










The authors are Senior Economist and Economist, respectively, in
the Animal Products Branch, Market and Trade Economics
Division, ERS.U.S. Dairy Industry in Brief
Milk production in 1999 was just over 162.7 billion
pounds, almost twice the quantity produced in the
early 20th century, when the first concerted efforts to
develop alternative milk pricing institutions were being
made. About 111,000 operations had milk cows in
1999. Milk is picked up at the farm, most often by
tank truck, at least every other day and is moved to
one or more of the 422 fluid bottling plants or 1,258
dairy product manufacturing plants for further process-
ing and manufacturing. Every step of the way, the milk
must be handled under sanitary conditions to guard
against bacterial contamination and either marketed
promptly as fluid milk or processed into storable man-
ufactured products. Milk production fluctuates season-
ally—generally expanding during the spring and early
summer (the flush season) and contracting in the fall
and winter (the short-supply season)—making it nec-
essary to coordinate a supply that is rising when fluid
milk demand is falling. In addition, while milk produc-
tion shows little daily variation, fluid milk sales vary
substantially from day to day. This daily variation in
sales, primarily because of consumer buying patterns,
becomes a significant problem when balancing fluctu-
ating milk supplies with demand and pricing the vari-
ous uses of milk. Manufactured dairy product demand
also shows seasonal variation—cheese and butter
demands are heavier in the fall and early winter.
Historically, two grades of milk have been identified:
Grade A and Grade B. The grade depends on the milk
meeting certain health (sanitary) standards. Sanitary
standards, some of which might also be called “quality
standards,” include the somatic cell count and bacterial
count and the conditions of farm facilities, including
the milking parlor, milk storage tank, and water well.
Grade A milk meets the sanitary standards for use in
fluid milk products and can be used for any dairy
product. Grade B, or manufacturing grade, milk meets
slightly lower standards and can be used only for man-
ufactured dairy products. Grades are not the same as
the classes of milk that are used in classified pricing
systems. Prior to World War I, less than half of milk
and cream marketings were Grade A. Only about 3
percent of all milk marketed did not meet Grade A
standards in 1999, even though roughly 60-65 percent
of all milk marketed ended up in manufactured dairy
products.
For many years, cooperatives owned by dairy farmers
have played a prominent role in the U.S. dairy indus-
try. In the early 1900’s, they were organized to bargain
for prices with dealers and handlers, a role they contin-
ue to perform today. The cooperatives have also had a
hand in how public dairy pricing policies and pro-
grams have evolved. In the 1960’s and 1970’s, the
scope of  dairy cooperatives changed as they became
regional rather than local organizations. The trend con-
tinues today with some cooperatives operating coast-
to-coast, though not in all regions. 
Milk possesses characteristics that individually
describe other agricultural products, but taken together
make marketing fluid milk different from marketing
any other agricultural commodity. Milk is produced
every day and must move to market at least every
other day—thus it is a flow commodity. Eggs are also
a flow commodity, but they can be and are stored.
Eggs also do not have the numerous multiple uses at
different values that milk does. Meat can be stored in
carcasses or cuts, vegetables are storable for several
days, and apples and pears can be stored for months.
In the short run (day to day), milk supply is not
attuned to milk demand. The cows produce every day
and the milk must go to market, even if the demand on
a particular day is low. The demand for milk for bot-
tling (packaging) is almost zero on Sundays and small
on Saturdays and Wednesdays, since most plants close
on those days in response to buyer demand schedules.
The milk that is still produced could be discarded only
at a high cost so it goes to manufactured product uses.
Substantial economies of scale exist in managing milk
supplies to deal with these day-to-day variations. A
single manager, a role many dairy cooperatives have
taken on, is more efficient than several individual firm
managers are, which encourages centralization of the
milk supply management functions.
Fluid grade milk can be used for milk and cream prod-
ucts or to manufacture cheese, butter, and other prod-
ucts. But its value in manufactured products is no
greater than that of manufacturing grade milk. The
costs of balancing a fluid milk market must be covered
by some means—which is where classified pricing
comes in. 
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		How the Pricing 
System Evolved
There is a wide array of milk and dairy product prices
in the United States: the all-milk price, the minimum
Class prices defined under Federal and State milk mar-
keting orders, the milk support price, wholesale prices
of cheese and other manufactured dairy products, retail
prices for fluid milk and manufactured dairy products,
and others (fig. 1). These prices, and others not men-
tioned, are either market-determined or administered
through some public dairy policy or program.
Included among the public policies and programs are
Federal milk price support, Federal milk marketing
orders, import restrictions, export subsidies, domestic
and international food aid programs, State-level milk
marketing programs, and a development of more recent
(1996) origin, a multi-State milk pricing organization.
Market pricing institutions include the dairy coopera-
tive and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange where both
wholesale dairy product prices are determined and
futures and options contracts for milk and dairy prod-
ucts are traded. In almost all cases, the major intent of
the public pricing policies and programs that have been
implemented is to influence producer (farm) milk
prices. The market pricing institutions influence both
producer and buyer (consumer) prices.
Soon after the Civil War, milk production in the United
States took on a much different character as dairy farm-
ers began moving more of their milk to both fluid and
manufactured dairy product processors supplying prod-
ucts in the rapidly growing urban areas of the country.
Previously, the largest share of production was used on
the farms—fed to animals, consumed by farm families
as fluid milk, or made into butter and cheese for farm
or very localized use. At the same time, shortrun price
instability associated with seasonal fluctuations in sup-
ply and use led to longrun uncertainties for milk pro-
ducers. The uncertainties and the price instability, taken
together, drove substantial numbers of dairy farmers
out of business—contributing to even greater produc-
tion and price swings in the short run.
It was observed early on that flow commodities, such
as milk, which were produced and marketed daily,
could not be priced efficiently by the methods
employed for most other commodities. Auctions or
daily negotiations between buyers and sellers of milk
would be costly to operate and result in dramatic daily
price variations. So, farmers attempted to organize to
bargain with processors over milk prices.
As early as 1900, producers in a number of markets
had banded together into cooperative associations to
bargain with fluid milk dealers or handlers for a flat
	
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Figure 1
Selected milk price series, 1995-99
Source: National Agricultural Statistics Service, Farm Service Agency, and Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA.price, a uniform price for all milk. However, flat pric-
ing would be sustainable only if all fluid milk sellers
bore their proportional share of the costs of maintain-
ing a reserve to cover unanticipated shortrun supply
and demand requirements, something that occurred
only rarely.
By the 1920’s, a classified price system, where han-
dlers paid for fluid grade milk according to its use, had
been adopted in most of the major markets. The price
paid for milk used in fluid products was higher than
that paid for milk used for manufactured dairy prod-
ucts, reflecting the greater costs of handling and mar-
keting perishable milk in fluid form (see box). Despite
the seasonal variability of production, the price to pro-
ducers was stabilized. Differential pricing (that is, pric-
ing beverage milk higher than milk for manufactured
products) reflected the greater cost of producing and
marketing milk for fluid use.
During the Great Depression, the classified pricing
systems broke down as the demand for milk dropped
drastically, and cooperatives faced intensified pressures
as more producers were cut off from the Class I (bev-
erage milk) market and took any price to get back into
it. Prices at all levels dropped sharply, and farmers
were in great economic distress. The inherent instabili-
ty of milk prices and the marketing problems that
arose with the Great Depression prompted dairy coop-
eratives to ask for government intervention to stabilize
milk marketing conditions. The Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933 authorized the Secretary of
Agriculture to enter into marketing agreements with
handlers, processors, and others and issue licenses to
handlers and processors to raise the prices of agricul-
tural commodities, including milk. Some attempts
were made to use marketing agreements to assist man-
ufacturing milk producers, principally farmers selling
milk to manufacturers of canned milk.
Congress revised the Agricultural Adjustment Act in
1935, authorizing Federal marketing orders for many
agricultural products that replaced the earlier agree-
ments and licenses. The 1935 Act contained more spe-
cific standards for milk than the 1933 Act. The
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 re-
enacted the 1935 Act and became the foundation for
the modern Federal milk marketing order system.
During World War II, there was a great need for all
kinds of food to feed the United States and its allies.
Demand for milk and dairy products was much greater
due to higher incomes from wartime employment and
military purchases of large volumes of products.
Exports of cheese, butter, canned milk, and dried milk
jumped manyfold in the war years. To meet this
demand, producers of many products, including milk,
were strongly encouraged to increase production
through a number of devices. Milk production was
encouraged through guaranteed higher prices to pro-
ducers. Under wartime price controls, prices to con-
sumers were kept down by paying subsidies to proces-
sors to offset the higher prices they had to pay for
milk—a major shift from efforts to raise producer
prices during the Depression.
The Agricultural Act of 1949 established a permanent
milk price support program following a period of piece-
meal extensions of wartime and earlier programs. Milk
marketing orders, which applied only to fluid grade
milk, were continued under the authority of the 1937
Act. Over the next 50 years, there were many changes
in the way these marketing orders were applied as tech-
nical and economic developments greatly changed the
way milk was produced, processed, and marketed.
The most recent Federal agricultural legislation (or
Farm Act) in 1996 called for dramatic changes in
Federal dairy policies and programs. The milk price
support program as it had traditionally been operated
was to be eliminated as of January 1, 2000, and the
Federal milk marketing order system was to be
“reformed.” Late in 1999, Congress passed legislation
bearing on these two policy objectives that are noted in
the appropriate sections.
While Federal policies and programs were changing
over time, State-level public policies and market pric-
ing institutions also evolved. Some of these changes
have been the result of reduced Federal intervention in
or regulation of the dairy industry.
Public Pricing Institutions
Federal and State milk marketing orders have influ-
enced farm milk prices since the 1930’s. Milk price
support was a wartime program that became embodied
in Federal legislation in 1949. The 1996 Act brought a
new public pricing institution into being—a multi-
State pricing organization, the Northeast Interstate
Dairy Compact. The programs described in this section
are separate—they have different primary objectives so
that when we talk about price regulations or mecha-
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Milk was priced, like most liquids, on the basis of simple volume until the very late 19th century.
However, anyone making dairy products knew that milk was far from uniform. The composition of milk
varied by producer, individual cow, stage of lactation, season, and other less explainable factors. Even
today, some milk can easily contain twice as much fat as some other milk. The Babcock test, developed in
1890, was a simple, fast, and accurate way of measuring the milkfat content of milk. It fairly directly
established the amount of cream or butter that could be produced from milk and also provided a fairly
accurate means of predicting cheese yields. The Babcock test revolutionized milk pricing and was rapidly
adopted by plants buying milk.
As the commercial dairy industry developed, measurement of the quantity of milk shifted from a volume
basis to weight because accurate determination of weight was generally easier. The use of the Babcock
test and the change to weighing milk led to the milk pricing method that would dominate throughout
most of the 20th century: dollars per 100 pounds, adjusted for milkfat content with a butterfat differen-
tial. Another pricing method, dollars per pound of milkfat has been used for cream and was sometimes
used for milk. It never was a satisfactory pricing method for many uses of milk and fell entirely out of
favor as skim solids became more valuable.
The intent of the butterfat differential is to represent the difference in value between milkfat and an equal
weight of skim milk. The differential results in prices that reflect the difference in value of milk with dif-
ferent milkfat contents, whether that milkfat content differs naturally or because cream has been added or
removed. (The differential should always be positive as long as approximately 10 pounds of butter has
greater value than a gallon of skim milk.)  Milkfat pricing dramatically improved pricing efficiency and, as
a side effect, reduced the incentive to adulterate milk by adding water. 
Prices often are quoted at a standard of 3.5-percent milkfat. The standard is largely arbitrary but is approx-
imately the seasonal low for the average fat test of all milk. If the 3.5-percent fat price is $12.00 per hun-
dred weight (cwt) and the butterfat differential is 13.5 cents, a producer delivering milk testing 3.70-per-
cent fat would receive a price of $12.00 plus 2 times $0.135—or $12.27 per cwt. Milkfat is not the only
milk component that varies to an economically significant degree. For example, the amount of casein has a
sizable effect on cheese yield. 
In recent years, various pricing methods have emerged that recognize differences in value due to milk
components other than just fat. Some have tried to determine a value for each component in 100 pounds of
milk with the milk price being the sum of the values, or used differentials or bonuses for protein or total
solids other than fat. Alternatively, some cheese plants have paid prices based on the predicted cheese
yield from the milk, including quality factors other than milk composition, such as somatic cell count. 
Reflecting differences in values of skim solids in milk prices is difficult because individual components
can have much different values in different uses of milk. And, the level of skim solids components is diffi-
cult (and often illegal) to adjust for specific uses. It is therefore difficult to say which pricing method(s)
will become the new norm. Pricing per pound of each component seems to be the most popular concept at
this time. In any case, some form of multiple component pricing would seem inevitable.
Courtesy of Jim Miller, ERS economist.nisms, they are not the same across programs. On the
other hand, each program is not implemented or
altered in a vacuum, and there have been and still are
linkages between them.
Price Supports, 1949-Present
Although it was not the first Federal dairy policy to be
enacted, milk price supports have been the backbone
of the pricing system for milk and dairy products for
some 50 years. The way that the support price level
was determined has changed over the years and, since
the early 1990’s, support prices have been well below
market prices so as to have little more than a psycho-
logical effect. The price support purchase program was
to be terminated at the end of 1999, but Congress
extended the program for 2 more years through
December 31, 2001.
The support price underpinned the entire price struc-
ture for bulk milk sold by farmers either directly to
processors or through cooperatives. The support price
was determined annually under provisions of the
Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended by succeeding
farm acts. USDA’s Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC) stood ready to buy as much butter, nonfat dry
milk, and Cheddar cheese as manufacturers wanted to
sell at specified support purchase prices. These prices
were calculated to assure that farmers received at least
the announced milk support price. The price support
program thus directly provided a floor under wholesale
milk product prices and the price of milk used to man-
ufacture these products, and indirectly provided price
support for all milk in all uses. 
In the past, milk price support purchases made by the
CCC removed significant milk surpluses from the mar-
ket. However, since the 1990’s, purchases have
declined dramatically with only nonfat dry milk being
acquired in significant amounts. Cheese prices have
been near support levels in 2000 and, while no CCC
purchases have been made, it is likely that the support
price has been sustaining the market price. In lieu of
the former open-ended offer to buy cheese, butter, and
nonfat dry milk at stated prices and then donating the
products to domestic and foreign food aid programs,
the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP) is now the
major surplus-removal program. It uses CCC funds to
subsidize exports of targeted dairy products to targeted
overseas markets, up to a specified quantity. The
United States has committed itself under multilateral
trade agreements to limiting and then reducing all sub-
sidized exports.
Until the 1996 Act, interest in developing alternatives
to the support purchase program was minimal or
nonexistent. Making modifications to the existing pro-
gram was a different story. Changing the relative
prices of purchased products, the products to be pur-
chased, and the pricing standard have all had propo-
nents. So, too, has establishing some sort of produc-
tion control program. A major change in the pricing
standard was made in 1981 when parity (see Glossary)
was replaced as the standard; a price related to milk
surpluses and CCC costs was offered in its place. 
The movement away from parity pricing removed the
flexibility the Secretary of Agriculture had in setting
the support price (it was possible to set the price in a
range from 75 to 90 percent of parity). Since 1981,
support prices have been written into legislation, mak-
ing them somewhat harder to adjust in a timely man-
ner. The 1996 Act established an incrementally down-
ward movement in the support price from $10.35 per
hundredweight (cwt) in 1996 to $9.90 per cwt in 1999.
There is no particular economic foundation for this
process—an initial price existed and a final price was
desired at the end of a specific time period. The two
extensions of the program were at the $9.90 per cwt
level.
Import Policies as Safeguards
The milk price support program maintained prices of
dairy products above international market levels. The
prices of manufactured dairy products in international
trade—primarily butter, cheeses, and dry milk pow-
ders—have been low compared with the domestic
prices in producing countries since World War II.
European dairy industries made (and still make) exten-
sive use of subsidies to export dairy products. In such
circumstances, import controls were seen as a means
of preventing the flooding of the U.S. market with for-
eign products.
Import quotas on dairy and other agricultural products
were authorized by Section 22 of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933, as amended. Quotas would
be imposed when it was determined that the imports
threatened the operation of the commodity price sup-
port programs. Such quotas were first imposed on
dairy products in 1951 under emergency legislation.
Higher supported milk prices in the United States
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lower to ship large quantities of dairy products to the
United States. Were that to happen, the U.S.
Government would be subsidizing milk production and
processing (including manufacturing) abroad through
the domestic price support program. The supplies of
imported dairy products would drive the prices of
those products in U.S. markets below the support pur-
chase price levels. Each further shipload of imported
product would replace U.S.-produced product in the
market that would then be offered for sale to CCC.
Potentially even greater imports could occur when the
exporting countries also subsidized exports.
The United States has participated in multilateral trade
negotiations over the years under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The GATT
came into being in 1947 and continued in existence
until it was superseded by the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 1994 during the Uruguay
Round (the last round) of GATT. The agreement pro-
vided a code of conduct and a framework for periodic
multilateral trade negotiations—a function no different
for the WTO. But the WTO is different in at least two
important ways. First, agricultural trade is now express-
ly subjected to specific rules. Second, greater powers
for adjudicating trade disputes brought before it by
member nations have been granted to the organization.
The Uruguay Round brought agricultural trade issues
to the forefront, as had no previous round. Signatory
nations embraced the conversion of non-tariff trade
protections to tariff-based systems. To meet that oblig-
ation in the case of dairy, a tariff-rate quota (TRQ)
system replaced the section 22 dairy import quotas on
January 1, 1995. The TRQ system is a two-tier tariff
system with a low-tier tariff rate applied to imports up
to a specified quantity and a high-tier rate applying to
any import quantity in excess of the specified level.
The TRQ rates and quantities vary by product. Another
objective of the Uruguay Round was increasing import
access, which could be accomplished by reducing
high-tier tariff rates, increasing the quantities subject
to the low-tier rates, or a combination of the two dur-
ing the implementation period (1995-2000) of the
agreement, and beyond.
The United States also concluded the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) covering trade among
Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The agreement
was signed late in 1993 and its provisions went into
effect January 1, 1994. The NAFTA dairy provisions
are laid out in a set of bilateral agreements. Inclusion
of more countries in NAFTA and preparations for the
next round of multilateral trade negotiations under
WTO are current issues which are likely to have a
bearing on future U.S. dairy trade. Changes of import
policies to date have altered the method of establishing
border protection, not the intent of shielding the U.S.
dairy industry, to some degree, from international
dairy market influences.
Federal Milk Marketing Orders, 1937-Present
Federal milk marketing orders are concerned primarily
with orderly marketing of raw fluid-grade milk from
the producer to the processor. Legal and technical lan-
guage makes them complex. Classified pricing and
pooling are the two key elements of the orders. As
required by the Federal Agriculture Improvement and
Reform Act of 1996, Federal milk marketing orders
were changed in 1999 in some fundamental ways.
Attempts to simplify order issues can always be criti-
cized in some quarter or another but that does not
imply that such attempts should be abandoned. One
approach for addressing milk marketing orders is to
lay out in general terms what they, as legal instru-
ments, can (could) and cannot (could not) “do.”
What They Do Promoting orderly marketing is a fun-
damental objective of Federal milk marketing orders.
To reach that goal, pricing rules that move milk
smoothly from the farm to processors then on to con-
sumers in desired quantities at the desired times are
defined. A major function of Federal milk marketing
orders is setting minimum prices for raw fluid-grade
milk that regulated handlers, often processors, must
pay to dairy farmers (usually through dairy coopera-

















A classified pricing system exists in the orders based
on the end use of the milk sold under them. Over time,
the number of classes has varied by order, from at least
	
			 	
		 ❖  #2 to 7 or 8. Class I use has been defined as the milk
going into beverage milk products. The other classes
have represented  aggregated or disaggregated uses for
other products which have varied at times. The mini-
mum prices to be paid for milk used in each class are
specified in each order. Underlying the entire classified
pricing system is the linkage between class prices and
the wholesale prices of manufactured dairy products.
The minimum price received by the farmers or their
cooperative from the regulated handler is not any one
of the class prices; rather, it is what is called the uni-
form or “blend” price. The blend price is a weighted
average of the class prices, with the weights being the
utilization (percent) of milk in each class in the specif-
ic market. Marketing orders provide the legal authority
for auditing regulated handlers to determine how their
milk is used and to make sure that they are paying the
appropriate minimum class price. The auditing authori-
ty also results in other valuable market information
such as “test” weights and sales of the different types
of beverage milks, e.g., whole and lowfat. Under this
system, each milk producer supplying the regulated
handlers in an order receives a price based on both the
higher priced fluid market and the lower priced other
product markets in that order. 
The prices established by orders are computed on a
pre-determined schedule designed to reflect the
dynamic nature of milk supplies and demand. We will
return to the question of setting prices in the section
describing the reformed Federal milk marketing orders
called for in the 1996 farm legislation. First, we con-
sider the other half of order basics.
What They Don’t Do Orders do not do anything that is
not related to setting minimum prices at the handler
level and determining that the regulated handlers pay
at least the minimum blend prices to producers. 
First, orders do not directly restrict the individual pro-
duction or marketings of milk producers. The orders
do not regulate producers at all. In a similar vein, the
orders do not guarantee a market for an individual pro-
ducer’s milk with any regulated handler. These state-
ments do not imply that the Federal milk marketing
orders do not have some influence on these activities.
Second, the regulated handlers are only regulated as to
the minimum prices they pay—how they use the milk
they receive is up to them. Handlers respond to known
or anticipated purchases by their customers for fluid
milk, which generally has first call, and then use the
remainder either for balancing or for storable manufac-
tured products. Thus, Federal orders do not guarantee
a fixed price to producers, not even a fixed minimum
blend price. The fact that utilization can change for
regulated handlers precludes such a guarantee.
In earlier times, numerous barriers to milk movement
arose due to the actions of State and local health
authorities that established sanitary regulations, prod-
uct specifications, and other rules. Such regulations
effectively protected local producers from competition.
Legal and legislative actions have eliminated the abili-
ty of such regulations to restrict milk movements by
establishing uniform regulations and specifications.
Federal milk marketing orders do not restrict milk
shipments from other Federal orders, although the
order prices undoubtedly have some effects—handlers
and cooperatives control milk movements, from pro-
ducers to processors, among processors and manufac-
turers, and from one geographic area to another.
Finally, the Federal milk marketing orders do not set
wholesale or retail milk and dairy product prices.
Wholesalers and retailers react to the demands placed
upon them by their customers and to internal business
decisions with regard to pricing. However, some State-
level laws regulate prices at the two levels.
Federal Order Reform
The 1996 Act required that the number of Federal milk
marketing orders be reduced from the 33 then in exis-
tence to no less than 10 nor more than 14, including
one for California if that State’s producers decided to
switch from their State pricing system to the Federal
system. The act also gave the Secretary of Agriculture
authority to examine pricing provisions. After review-
ing proposals made by many groups and individuals,
USDA published a proposed rule in winter 1998. The
proposed final rule was published April 2, 1999, in the
Federal Register with a target date of October 1, 1999,
for implementation. Congress stepped in to modify the
USDA plan, and that congressionally modified plan
was implemented January 1, 2000. 
All facets of the Federal milk marketing orders are


























































The concept of a price mover (noted above in 2 and 3)
needs to be developed more fully. It is this price that
links the milk price support program to the Federal
milk marketing orders so that changes in one program
are reflected in the other. This price mover was chosen
to reflect prices in unregulated milk markets and align
the unregulated and the regulated markets. This link
represents a fine point that is sometimes lost in the
debates concerning public dairy policies and pro-
grams—the public programs were not intended to
replace unregulated market price determinations but to
work along with them.
From 1968 to about the middle of 1995, the mover
was the M-W (or a modified version of it) price—the
price of manufacturing grade milk in Minnesota and
Wisconsin, where most of the manufacturing grade
milk was produced. Early in the 1990’s, USDA decid-
ed that the M-W should be replaced. The most com-
mon argument put forward for replacing the M-W rest-
ed on the relatively small and declining volume of
milk being used to compute the price (the thin market
argument).
The Basic Formula Price (BFP) was introduced in
1995 as a temporary replacement for the M-W (which
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Figure 2













Differences in shading merely serve to
differentiate between marketing areas.
Source: Dairy programs, Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA
Floridawas still being made available) to determine the mini-
mum Class III price regulated handlers would be
required to pay. It used the prices of butter, cheese, and
nonfat dry milk in formulas to adjust the M-W price.
Figure 3 shows the linkage between the milk price
support program and the Federal milk marketing
orders as they were defined on January 1, 2000. The
formulas that are used to determine the class prices
now incorporate component prices. The use of compo-
nent pricing is not “new”—it had been used in some of
the previously existing 31 orders. Under the new 11
orders, more milk came under such pricing. Under the
old rules, Class I and Class II prices were determined
by adding differentials to the BFP (which was the
Class III price); the current method is much changed
(Appendix A).
The reform of the Federal marketing order system has
been characterized as a move toward a more market-
oriented dairy industry. However, the basic purpose of
the system is unchanged—to provide orderly market
conditions so that producers are assured of stable mar-
kets and consumers have an adequate supply of milk
and dairy products. To that end, the minimum prices
that handlers must pay will continue to be established
using a classified pricing system that incorporates
national market prices for dairy products and recog-
nizes the higher costs associated with supplying fluid
milk markets.
Compacts
The 1996 Act brought to the national stage a concept
that had been under discussion in the Northeast for
many years—an interstate compact for dairy market
regulation. Congress granted its consent to the forma-
tion of the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact (the
Compact) in the 1996 Act to include six States—
Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and Rhode Island, if certain conditions
were met. The conditions included a finding of “com-
pelling public interest” by the Secretary of Agriculture,
which was issued in August 1996.
The proponents of the Compact argued that regulatory
authority over the dairy marketplace in the New
England States needed to be restored to the six States,
acting together. This is a key fact—the compact gave
the States powers to regulate a commodity that was
moving in interstate commerce. States are not permit-
ted this role unless granted the authority by Congress.
The possibility that other States might join the
Compact existed, but has not yet happened. A
Compact Commission established to implement the
Compact pricing authority met for the first time in
September 1996.
The Compact Commission regulates only the farm
price of Class I milk. Through formal rule-making, the
Commission arrived at a Compact over-order Class I
price of $16.94 per cwt that was set in July 1997 and
has been unchanged since. Compact pricing was to
work in conjunction with Federal milk pricing in the
region. The 1996 Farm Act originally linked the dura-
tion of the Compact to the implementation of the
Federal milk marketing reform.
Compact-regulated handlers are obligated to pay the
$16.94 per cwt minimum Class I price. If the Federal
minimum Class I price in the Compact area is $16.94
or above, the producer price is calculated using the
Federal order procedures. When the minimum Class I
price in the Compact area is below $16.94, a two-step
price calculation occurs. First, the Federal order price
is calculated using the minimum Class I price. Second,
an “over-order” obligation per cwt is defined as the
difference between $16.94 and the minimum Class I
price. Each regulated handler pays an amount into a
pool operated by the Compact Commission equal to
the over-order obligation multiplied by Class I sales.
Under the terms of the Compact, monies are set aside
to meet certain requirements, for example, to reim-
burse CCC if there are increases in production in the
Compact area that wind up as CCC product purchases.
The balance of the pool proceeds (in dollars) is then
divided by the total pounds of producer milk in the
region to determine what is called the Compact pro-
ducer price. All producers supplying the Compact area,
including those outside it, receive the Compact pro-
ducer price (per cwt) payment in addition to the price
calculated on the basis of the Federal order pricing
rules. To reiterate, the price received by the producer
consists of two parts when the Compact over-order
obligation is present. Detailed information on the
Compact and how it operates may be found on its web
site—the address is included in the list of information
sources.
The Compact has proven to be a lightning rod for
regional conflict in the industry. Over 20 legislatures
in the South and elsewhere have passed enabling legis-
lation to join future compacts, if the opportunity arises.
Southern dairy farmers have been particularly vocifer-
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Whether the political environment will ever allow con-
sideration of dairy compacts again is questionable,
especially since there is resistance to “reopening” farm
legislation before 2002. Even so, the enthusiasm for
establishing compacts has not weakened.
The Congress added to the debate by extending the life
of the Northeast Compact by 2 years, but not authoriz-
ing any others. The extension of the Northeast
Compact essentially broke the link between the life of
the Compact and the implementation of Federal order
reform that had been written in the 1996 Act. Debates
about the Compact have tended to be waged outside
the order reform question.
State Regulations
The authority to regulate intrastate milk markets was
denied to the Federal government in court decisions
early in the New Deal period. These court decisions
led the States to make efforts to assist dairy farmers
suffering economic hardships at the time by imple-
menting State milk controls, a power they clearly
enjoyed. Some States went beyond producer price reg-
ulation to regulate wholesale and retail dairy prices as
well. Both direct and indirect regulation was applied to
wholesale and retail prices. 
Many States fixed prices at the producer, wholesale,
and retail levels during the Depression. State regula-
tion has declined in recent years but many of the States
retain the authority to control milk markets. State regu-
lations are important from a national perspective
because of which States do control milk prices.
California (discussed in a following section) and
Pennsylvania, two of the top five producing States in
1999, are the prime examples.
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Figure 3
Linkages between the milk price support program and the Federal milk marketing orders
Milk Use
















Other effects on 
farm milk price
Wholesale product
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA.Producer Prices
About three-quarters of the 50 States have tried pro-
ducer price regulation at some time since 1933.
Various methods have been used to establish the price:
• Direct relationships to measures of cost of produc-
tion or changes in those costs,
• Connections to prices in nearby Federal milk mar-
keting orders,
• Economic formulas, and
• Hearing processes where all interested parties, pro-
ducers, processors, and consumer groups, present
their cases and some price is recommended and ulti-
mately approved or not. When a recommendation is
not approved, more hearings may be called. 
Some recent State legislative attempts to regulate
prices arose from dissatisfaction with the system in
place. Many of those attempts were overturned in the
courts. While not setting prices, several States have
established producer security trust funds to provide
compensation to farmers should their milk handlers go
bankrupt without payment to them. California has
gone further. Under an exception granted in the 1996
Act, that State has set composition standards for bever-
age milk at higher levels than Federal standards, an
action that has been challenged.
Consumer Level
Several States regulate either the wholesale or the
retail prices of fluid milk products, or both. States dif-
fer in the regulation of resale prices—some set mini-
mum prices, some set maximum prices, and some set
both minimums and maximums. For example,
Pennsylvania essentially sets minimums at every mar-
ket level for milk produced and marketed in the State.
Minimum prices are set at a stop-loss level (conditions
based on the estimated average cost of production),
and market prices are generally above them. Other
States, such as Nevada, set prices that retailers must
pay for milk, but do not restrict the price the retailer
charges consumers. State milk pricing regulations are
much less prevalent than they used to be.
There are many reasons for maintaining resale price
control of milk—not the least of which is the desire to
retain the backing of handlers for control at the pro-
ducer level by giving them guaranteed margins. From
a public policy standpoint, however, the primary argu-
ment is that retail pricing is inherently unstable and
frequently leads to destructive price wars. The chang-
ing structure of the milk production and marketing
sectors along with the accompanying change in the
nature of the pricing process have substantially weak-
ened this argument.
Under the typical milk marketing system of the 1950’s,
handlers provided full service to retail stores, including
pricing milk and milk products, display case arrange-
ment, and daily delivery. A typical store had two to six
brands of milk, each serviced by a different handler. In
practice, the handlers effectively determined prices,
and the store received a fixed margin. While the han-
dler did not have absolute control over prices, as did a
gasoline company in its leased stations, the control
was still strong. If one handler reduced retail prices,
other handlers with milk in the same store were under
strong pressure to follow.
In the present market, retailers generally exert a
stronger control over pricing. Larger chain stores often
have their own bottling and distribution plants. There
is typically no more than one brand per store in addi-
tion to private label, and often there is only private
label. Also, chain stores purchase for a large number
of stores at the division level rather than at the local
level. Under these circumstances, resale price control
no longer serves the function it once did.
Most States with resale price-fixing authority, and
many without, have authority to regulate trade prac-
tices. State trade practice laws usually prohibit all or
most of the following: free merchandise, unreasonable
extension of credit, secret rebates and discounts, free
signs, unearned advertising allowances, loaning of
money, free equipment, free repairs and services, sales
below cost at the wholesale or retail level, price dis-
crimination, and purchase price discrimination. Also,
several States require a minimum markup, particularly
by retailers, while others require that prices be filed
with the State agency. By prohibiting many forms of
nonprice competition, such as those listed above, there
is some tendency to force competition more strongly
into the price arena.
California Milk Pricing
Like milk markets everywhere, the markets in
California were in disarray as the full weight of the
Depression was felt. Californians first looked to the
Federal Government for assistance. Based on the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, the Federal
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		Government issued milk marketing agreements for Los
Angeles, Alameda County, and San Diego in
November and December of 1933, with expectations
to do likewise in other markets. The courts declared
Federal regulation of a local market illegal because no
interstate commerce was involved and the Los Angeles
and other agreements were terminated in 1934. In view
of this problem with the Federal regulation, milk pro-
ducers and distributors in California moved to draft
and secure passage of State laws.
Producer price regulation was contained in the Young
Act of 1935. The legislation designated a third party,
the Director of Agriculture, to establish minimum
prices to be paid for fluid milk and cream to producers
by distributors. Three “standards” were to be consid-
















A classified pricing system with Class 1 milk for bev-
erage use was the foundation of the minimum price.
The 1935 law did not require pooling, so producers
with contracts serving high Class 1 utilization distribu-
tors had a great advantage. It was not until the 1950’s
and 1960’s that action was taken to address disparate
prices paid to producers for milk that was essentially
the same compositionally. The Gonsalves Milk
Pooling Act of 1967 established the mechanisms for
pooling and allocating revenues among California pro-
ducers that are in effect today.
Unlike Federal milk marketing orders, which came to
use component pricing recently, California regulations
have recognized values for butterfat and solids-not-fat
(SNF) for many years. Under today’s system of five
classes, Classes 2, 3, 4a, and 4b are priced on the basis
of fat and SNF through product price formulas. Class 1
milk has an added component, the fluid carrier (water)
which is given a small value. California producers also
have a system of quotas that are incorporated into their
pricing plan, the quota being for “market” milk or
fluid grade. Quota can be bought and sold, and it may
be increased by the State if necessary.
Resale price regulation in California is authorized
under a separate law, the Desmond Act, drafted in late
1936 and enacted in September 1937. The law gave
the California Director of Agriculture the authority to
establish minimum wholesale and retail prices for fluid
milk and cream throughout the State for all wholesale
sales to stores and restaurants, retail store prices, and
home delivery prices. Price cutting and secret rebates
between distributors and retail stores were the primary
targets of the regulations. As the Desmond Act became
operational, some sellers attempted to circumvent its
rules. One approach was to discount other dairy prod-
ucts’ (other than fluid and cream products) prices. This
practice led to further regulation of trade practices to
eliminate such indirect price-cutting.
The California pricing system has been operating since
the 1930’s on the set of rules that were written at the
time, with alterations to adapt the laws to changing
economic developments. In recent years, as Federal
milk marketing orders have come under increasing
pressures for change, so too has the California system.
Even though two pricing systems are operating, there
are attempts to reduce friction between them. For
example, California law requires that the Class 1 price
in the State be aligned with the Class I prices in adja-
cent Federal milk marketing orders. 
Nongovernment (Market) 
Pricing Institutions
As noted earlier, not all of the pricing institutions for
milk are based on public policy decisions. The long-
standing cooperative presence in the dairy industry has
played a major part in pricing. The development of
milk and dairy product futures markets has provided
milk producers another way to address their concerns
about price movements and risk management issues.
The Role of Cooperatives
Dairy cooperatives broadened the scope of their opera-
tions in the 1970’s when they became regional rather
than local organizations. Mergers, consolidations, and
acquisitions are again altering the structure of dairy
cooperatives today—some have “gone national.” Each
cooperative has chosen its own particular approach to
the question of how, if at all, to restructure. 
Regardless of their size, the roles of the dairy coopera-
tives in both regulated and unregulated milk markets
have changed. The cooperatives still represent member
interests in the rulemaking processes of Federal- and
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price issues. But other roles have become more promi-
nent and claimed more of the public’s attention. In
1997, dairy cooperatives sold 61 percent of the milk
they handled as raw milk to buyers; the remainder was
processed or manufactured in cooperative plants. 
In many cases, the cooperatives have assumed opera-
tion of a complete milk procurement and distribution
system. Assembling milk from the farm, routing raw
milk where it is needed, managing or coordinating
movements of processed or manufactured products,
and managing surplus milk, defined for our purposes
as supplies above fluid requirements, are all parts of
the system. Taken together, these activities are called
“balancing.”
Procuring and coordinating a fluctuating supply to
meet varying demands is costly to individual handlers.
A full-supply arrangement with a cooperative can
reduce the cost. Cooperatives supply the exact needs
of the handler for fluid use and/or ice cream and cot-
tage cheese production and manage the remaining milk
for other uses. Full-supply arrangements do not elimi-
nate fluctuations, but they do provide a relatively sim-
ple, routine way of balancing supply and demand with
minimum effort or expense to the processor.
Cooperatives can achieve significant economies of
scale by coordinating supplies with demands using
full-supply arrangements and can reduce the uncertain-
ties for handlers, fluid milk processors, and dairy prod-
uct manufacturers. The reserve supplies that must be
carried to meet the fluctuating demands of an entire
market are smaller and less variable for a cooperative
servicing the entire market than the sum of individual
fluid handler reserves. A single agent moving milk
between producers and users and among the users is
more efficient also. Savings from a centralized supply
and surplus management operation can be shared
among the cooperatives providing the services and the
fluid milk processors.
Full-supply agreements are not always a plus for the
cooperatives. If members cannot produce enough milk
to meet commitments that have been made, the coop-
erative may have to buy milk from sources in other
Federal milk marketing orders, sometimes at a sub-
stantial premium, to make up the shortage. This ulti-
mately is an added cost to the cooperative that its pro-
ducer members absorb. The economies of scale that
cooperatives can achieve by adopting a full-supply
arrangement can be large enough so that both coopera-
tives and handlers benefit, but there are instances
where this is not the case. One example is the high uti-
lization markets of the Southeast—the cooperative
may have to purchase milk at unattractive prices to
meet commitments under full-supply contracts.
Cooperatives have influenced price making in the reg-
ulated milk markets. Changes in the bargaining rela-
tionships in the procurement markets and centralized
management of milk movements have meant lower
operating costs for cooperatives. The resulting environ-
ment has fostered cooperatives’ ability to bargain for
and obtain payments above the minimum prices estab-
lished in Federal milk marketing orders to help defray
some of the costs of servicing those markets. These
“over-order” payments were paid in nearly all Federal
orders in recent years. The over-order payment is
reflected in the price to members only of the coopera-
tive that obtained it.
Futures and Options Contracts 
Many commodities, including agricultural ones such as
live cattle and hogs, are being priced at least partially
on the basis of futures contracts. The advent of futures
and options contracts for Cheddar cheese, butter, non-
fat dry milk, and raw fluid milk was seen by some as
the prelude to a new era in milk pricing. Were they to
be widely used, futures and options contracts could be
used to manage price instability. 
In June 1993, Cheddar cheese and nonfat dry milk
futures and options contracts were introduced on the
Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE, now
known as the New York Board of Trade). Previously,
only butter futures had existed on the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME) since 1919, but they were
used to a great degree only in the late 1940’s and early
1950’s. Interest in butter futures was low since the
milk price support program, with its product purchas-
es, greatly limited downside price risk for milk and its
products. Why would anyone be interested in manag-
ing butter price risk when there was so little?
Times have clearly changed with respect to the price
risk situation. As the role of the price support program
as a floor under prices has been reduced, milk price
volatility has increased. In the current price environ-
ment, one would expect a growing interest in risk
management tools such as futures and options, but to
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product futures and options contracts have been unmet.
The manufactured product contracts never really took
off, nor did the markets gain the broad liquidity that
characterizes other successful futures and options mar-
kets. The BFP (Basic Formula Price) futures were
more successful, and, if a futures market develops that
represents the new Class I mover, either the Class III
or Class IV price, it too could be viable.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission
approved a Grade A milk futures and options contract
in October 1995 that proved difficult to understand. A
BFP futures and options contract was begun on the
CME in 1997 that reached a market milestone in
March 1999 as open interest in it surpassed 5,000 con-
tracts. The open interest indicates participation has
grown to levels that are likely to make the contract a
viable one. As long as there is price volatility in cash
markets for milk and dairy products, the dairy industry
will continue to evaluate futures and options contracts
for price risk management. Both Class III and Class
IV futures and options contracts began trading on the
CME in the first half of 2000.
In January of 1999, USDA started the Dairy Option
Pilot Program (DOPP) to introduce milk producers to
the futures and options approach for managing risks.
DOPP is a cost-sharing program that allows dairy
farmers, meeting certain requirements, to gain hands-
on experience with options trading for a period of 6 to
8 months. USDA pays 80 percent of the premium (or
cost) of each option and broker fees up to $30 per
option—the farmer is responsible for the other 20 per-
cent of the premium or cost. The first farmers in the
DOPP program were located in designated counties in
California, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Vermont, and Wisconsin.
In July 1999, the Secretary of Agriculture announced a
“second round” of the DOPP that expanded the pro-
gram in the original 7 States by adding 12 more coun-
ties and extending the program to an additional 49
counties in 25 other States. Almost 1,700 put options
were purchased by the 425 producers who participated
in the first round of the program. The put option gave
the producers the right, but not the obligation, to sell a
futures contract, thereby establishing a price floor for
their milk. This hedging alternative can protect pro-
ducer income in the event market prices fall below the
put option price. If market prices exceed the put option
price, the option can expire unused. Further program
expansion to 300 counties was included in legislation
signed by President Clinton in June 2000.
The development of the dairy futures and options con-
tracts has given milk producers an opportunity to
negotiate forward price contracts with the buyers of
their milk. Congress directed the USDA to establish a
pilot program to examine the issues related to forward
contracting under Federal orders. In July 2000, the
final rules for this pilot program were issued. The
Agricultural Marketing Service has provided detailed
information and frequently asked questions and
answers on its web site (see information sources).
Producer risk is not totally eliminated by the forward
pricing—producers can lock in a price that ends up
being below the prevailing market price in the future
period. However, these types of arrangements do
remove uncertainty and that can be advantageous for
producers as they make decisions about their futures.
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in the Future
Economic theory posits that the role of pricing is to
balance the supply of a product with the demand for it.
We have shown that the pricing system that has evolved
for milk in the United States is a complex set of market
and public institutions. Many of the pricing arrange-
ments that have arisen can be tied to the unique physi-
cal properties of milk. Creating a balance between sup-
ply and demand for milk requires establishing and





















The milk pricing system has been responsive to
changes in the economic and political forces affecting
dairy farming. The fact that one can trace the various
changes through legislative histories illustrates this
facet of the system. There is pressure currently to con-
tinue making changes—with the elimination of public
pricing institutions as a stated goal of some. Whether
that happens remains to be seen but further changes in
the system will likely be forthcoming. International
trade negotiations carry the potential for further import
and export regulations of some significance. The con-
tinuing restructuring of dairy cooperatives and propri-
etary dairy companies (such as Dean Foods and Suiza)
has included and will likely continue to include joint
ventures that could alter milk pricing relationships. We
have used the term “evolved” in several instances in
the text; that term will continue to describe the milk
pricing system into the future.
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Bacteria count. A measure of milk quality. There are
some organisms capable of surviving milk pasteuriza-
tion or refrigeration processes. Keeping the level of
these organisms low is a quality standard.
Balancing. A service usually provided by dairy coop-
eratives to tailor milk supplies to each handler in a
market to that handler’s needs. It involves directing
milk movements between farms and handlers’ plants
and among plants, managing imports from outside the
region and stocks, and diverting supplies in excess of
handlers’ needs to alternative outlets, such as manufac-
turing plants.
Basic Formula Price (BFP). An adjusted competitive
pay price for manufacturing grade milk used as the
mover of most Federal milk marketing order class
prices from mid-1995 to January 1, 2000. The adjust-
ment to the competitive pay price was a formula based
on the month-to-month change in the prices of manu-
factured dairy products. It also established the current
Class III price under the orders.
Blend price. A minimum weighted average price in
Federal milk market orders based on the proportion of
Grade A milk allocated to each use class. Producers
receive the blend price with adjustments for butterfat
content and plant location if so specified.
Class I differential. The amount added to the class
price mover (see BFP) in a Federal milk marketing
order to obtain the given order’s minimum Class I
price. The same procedure is used in State marketing
programs, but the nomenclature might be different.
Classified pricing. A structure of prices that differ
according to category of use. In Federal and some
State orders, regulated processors are required to pay a
minimum price for Grade A milk according to the
class in which it is used. States, like California, have
price structures analogous to the current Federal milk
marketing orders (as of January 1, 2000) that have four
classes (uses):
Class I. Grade A milk used in all beverage milks.
Class II. Grade A milk used in fluid cream products,
yogurts, or perishable manufactured products (ice
cream, cottage cheese, and others).
Class III. Grade A milk used to produce cream cheese
and hard manufactured cheese.
Class IV. Grade A milk used to produce butter and any
milk in dried form.
Composition (of milk). Milk components are usually
defined as fat solids, solids-not-fat (SNF), and fluid
carrier (water). The SNF include proteins, minerals,
and sugars. Milk pricing can be based on the values of
the components and their proportions in producers’
milk. This is generally called component pricing.
Cooperative. A firm that is owned by its farmer-mem-
bers, is operated for their benefit, and distributes earn-
ings on the basis of patronage (volume of milk).
Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP). A program
that provides cash bonuses (subsidies) to exporters of
U.S. dairy products to sell targeted dairy products in
targeted overseas markets. Under recently implement-
ed trade policy agreements, this program is being
downsized in terms of both quantities to be exported
and expenditures.
Economies of size. Increasing returns as use of factors
is expanded in least-cost combinations. A situation
where efficiently operated larger firms (farms) are
more profitable than efficiently operated smaller firms
(farms). The advantage can arise from lower produc-
tion costs, volume premiums for products (outputs), or
volume discounts for inputs. Once an operation reach-
es a certain size, the marginal cost of producing addi-
tional output begins to decline.
Federal milk marketing order. A regulation issued by
the Secretary of Agriculture specifying minimum
prices and conditions under which regulated milk han-
dlers must operate when selling fluid milk products
within a specified geographic area.
Fluid grade (Grade A) milk. Milk produced under
sanitary conditions that qualify it for fluid consump-
tion. Only Grade A milk is regulated under Federal
milk marketing orders.
Fluid milk. Packaged dairy products used as beverage
milks.
Fluid products. A term traditionally used to define the
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market used to produce fluid (Class I) milk.
Interstate compact. A formal agreement between or
among States, enacted through State and Federal legis-
lation, which allows the combined States to exert
authority not granted to them by law.
Manufacturing grade (Grade B) milk. Milk not meet-
ing the fluid grade standards. Less stringent standards
generally apply.
Manufacturing milk. Grade B milk or the Grade A
milk used in the production of manufactured dairy
products.
Manufacturers. Generally refers to the producers of
cheese, butter, nonfat dry milk, and other storable
dairy products.
Minnesota-Wisconsin (M-W) price. A monthly aver-
age price per hundredweight paid by plants for manu-
facturing grade milk in Minnesota and Wisconsin. The
price is obtained from a survey of cheese and butter-
powder plants conducted in the two States by USDA’s
National Agricultural Statistics Service.
Over-order payment. Payment above Federal order min-
imum prices negotiated between buyers and sellers to
cover the cost of providing market services or attracting
adequate milk supplies for both fluid and manufacturing
uses. Over-order payments also could result from mar-
ket power or regulation (see Compacts section, p. 10).
Parity price. Originally defined as the price that gives
a unit of an agricultural commodity the same purchas-
ing power today as it had in a base period, traditionally
1910-14. In 1948, parity procedures were modified to
adjust for changes in relative farm prices between the
base period and the most recent 10 years.
Perishable manufactured dairy products.
Manufactured dairy products with limited storage life,
including ice cream, cottage cheese, and bulk con-
densed milk.
Pooling. With a classified pricing system such as that
used in Federal and State orders, processors pay differ-
ent prices for milk in each category of use. Producers
are paid a weighted average, or “blend,” price for all
uses of milk in a particular order or market. Processors
pay into or draw out of the pool on the basis of their
utilization of milk relative to market average utiliza-
tion. Producers participating in the pool receive identi-
cal uniform blend prices, with adjustments for butterfat
content and location of the plant to which the milk is
delivered. In markets with multiple component pricing,
adjustments also are made for protein and other solids.
Price system (mechanism). An expression referring to
the role of prices in a market economy in conveying
information and providing incentives.
Processors. Generally refers to firms that process raw
Grade A milk into fluid products.
Somatic cell count. A measure of milk quality based
on the number of somatic cells that appear in the milk.
Somatic means “of or related to the body” so that
almost any body cell is included. The number of the
white blood cells (infection-fighting cells) is relevant
here. High levels of these cells appear in response to
inflammations that can be a sign of mastitis. The com-
position of milk can be influenced by somatic cell
counts.
Storable manufactured dairy products. Manufactured
dairy products, including butter, nonfat dry milk, and
hard cheeses, that can be stored for relatively long
periods of time.
Support price for milk. When a support purchase pro-
gram is in operation, the price of manufacturing grade
milk that the Government must ensure is received, on
average, by farmers.
Support purchase prices. Announced prices at which
the Government will purchase any offered manufac-
tured dairy products meeting its specifications. They
are set at levels where plants will pay the support price
for milk.
Surplus. The difference between commercial milk
supplies and the amount demanded by the market at a
given price. CCC net removals (price-support purchas-
es plus DEIP shipments minus domestic sales for unre-
stricted use) approximate the surplus during a particu-
lar period.
Test. Commonly in the phrases “at test” or “test
weight,” the measure of fat in milk. The predominant
method used in the United States is the Babcock test,
developed in 1890.
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Order Price Formulas1
Note: Milk prices are per 100 pounds or cwt, rounded
to the nearest cent. Component prices are per pound,
rounded to the nearest one-hundredth cent. Cheese,
dry whey, butter, and nonfat dry milk prices are
weighted averages of weekly NASS survey prices.
Class I
Class I price = (Class I skim milk price x 0.965) +
(Class I butterfat price x 3.5).
Class I skim milk price = Higher of advanced Class III
or IV skim milk pricing factors + applicable Class I
differential.
Class I butterfat price = Advanced butterfat price +
(applicable Class I differential divided by 100).
Note: Advanced pricing factors are computed using
applicable price formulas listed below, except that
product price averages are for 2 weeks.
Class II
Class II price = (Class II skim milk price x 0.965) +
(Class II butterfat price x 3.5).
Class II skim milk price = Advanced Class IV skim
milk pricing factor + $0.70.
Class II butterfat price = Butterfat price + $0.007.
Class II nonfat solids price = Class II skim milk price
divided by 9.
Class III
Class III price = (Class III skim milk price x 0.965) +
(butterfat price x 3.5).
Class III skim milk price = (protein price x 3.1) +
(other solids price x 5.9).
Protein price (true protein) = ((cheese price – 0.165) x
1.405) + ((((cheese price-0.165) x 1.582) – butterfat
price) x 1.28).
Other solids price = (dry whey price – 0.140) divided
by 0.968, snubbed at zero.
Butterfat price = (butter price – 0.115) divided by
0.82.
Class IV
Class IV price = (Class IV skim milk price x 0.965) +
(butterfat price x 3.5).
Class IV skim milk price = nonfat solids price x 9.
Nonfat solids price = (nonfat dry milk price – 0.140).
Butterfat price = See Class III.
Producer Prices:
Butterfat price = See Class III.
Protein price = See Class III.
Other solids price = See Class III.
Somatic cell adjustment rate = cheese price x 0.0005,
rounded to fifth decimal place. Rate is per 1,000
somatic cell count difference from 350,000.
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1Formulas have been modified  by a tentative decision that took
effect January 1, 2001. However, the Agricultural Marketing
Service (AMS) accepted comments on the changes until early
February. Further changes may be made based on those comments.
Further details of the tentative decision can be found on the AMS
Dairy Program web site,
http://www.ams.usda.gov/dairy/index.htm.